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Abstract—Spectrum misuse behaviors, brought either by il-
legitimate access or by rogue power emission, endanger the
legitimate communication and deteriorate the spectrum usage
environment. In this paper, our aim is to detect whether the spec-
trum band is occupied, and if it is occupied, recognize whether the
misuse behavior exists. One vital challenge is that the legitimate
spectrum exploitation and misuse behaviors probabilistically co-
exist and the illegitimate user (IU) may act in an intermittent and
fast-changing manner, which brings about much uncertainty for
spectrum sensing. To tackle it, we firstly formulate the spectrum
sensing problems under illegitimate access and rogue power
emission as a uniform ternary hypothesis test. Then, we develop
a novel test criterion, named the generalized multi-hypothesis
Neyman-Pearson (GMNP) criterion. Following the criterion, we
derive two test rules based on the generalized likelihood ratio
test (GLRT) and the Rao test, respectively, whose asymptotic
performances are analyzed and an upper bound is also given.
Furthermore, a cooperative spectrum sensing scheme is designed
based on the global GMNP criterion to further improve the
detection performances. In addition, extensive simulations are
provided to verify the proposed schemes’ performance under
various parameter configurations.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
Due to the explosive growth of wireless devices and ser-
vices, the scarceness of spectrum resources has become more
and more serious. Dynamic spectrum sharing has been well
recognized as a promising approach to improve the spectrum
utilization and relieve the spectrum shortage [1]–[3]. However,
it may put the future at risk brought by various attacks [4],
[5], among which spectrum misuse behaviors have received
increasingly wide attention. Generally, spectrum misuse be-
haviors refer to the manner of exploiting spectrum that violates
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(b) Rogue power emission
Fig. 1: Spectrum misuse behaviors and a distributed detection
framework. Dotted lines denote the received signal of sensors
due to the probabilistic emission behaviors of the IU and the
legitimate user (LU), while the solid lines denote that sensors
report decisions to the fusion center (FC).
the spectrum regulations. As illustrated in Fig. 1, two typical
spectrum misuse behaviors are as follows:
• Illegitimate access launched by external attackers, just
as shown in Fig. 1 (a). One example is the primary
user emulation (PUE) attack [6]–[9] that launches the
denial of service (DoS) attack, where the illegitimate user
emulates he characteris cs of the primary user’s signal
when the sensors conduct spectrum sensing in order
to prevent the secondary users from accessing the idle
spectrum [10]–[13]. Another example is the fake or rogue
access point (AP) that disguises as an authorized AP
by spoofing the authorized AP’s medium access control
(MAC) address in order to lure users to connect to them
[14] [15]. In addition, the illegitimate access can be done
indirectly through launching data falsification attacks in
the cooperative spectrum sensing [16] [17], where the
global decisions are misled and as a result, collisions
between secondary users and the primary user increase
and attackers illegitimately access the idle channel [18],
[19].
• Rogue power emission taken by internal attackers, just as
shown in Fig. 1 (b). In some cases, a selfish attacker may
break the upper bound of the transmit power constraint
for a higher data rate [20] [21]. Similarly, some malicious
attackers may intentionally apply for spectrum exploita-
tion with a large coverage, quoting a high transmit power,
but in fact they work with a low transmit power, which
decreases the spectrum efficiency of spatial reuse [22].
The internal attackers have obtained the authorization of
the usage of the spectrum, and as a result, this kind of
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2misuse behaviors is stealthier.
These spectrum misuse behaviors lead to serious inter-
ference with the legitimate communication and disordered
spectrum usage environment, which poses a fundamental re-
quirement on the detection of these misuse behaviors.
B. Related Work
Spectrum misuse behaviors pose direct influences on the
channel states, while spectrum sensing plays a vital role in
obtaining the real-time channel states. Further, considering
the high feasibility, spectrum sensing based methods have
been exploited in the detection of spectrum misuse behaviors
[12], [20], [23]–[25]. Specifically, the detection problem of the
illegitimate access is formulated as a statistical significance
test between the normal usage and the abnormal one in [25],
where the normal usage is defined as being no more than
one transmitter working in each portion (e.g., channel) of the
spectrum. But, it can’t find out the case that only the IU works.
To tackle this problem, [12] introduces the spectrum policy
maker to obtain the factual state of the LU, based on which
the detection is divided into two cases, i.e., when the LU isn’t
working and when the LU is working. Especially, when the
existence of the IU taking illegitimate access is prior known,
an optimal combining scheme is proposed for cooperative
spectrum sensing (CSS) in [23]. Differently, considering the
assumption that no more than one user, either the LU or the
IU, works on a spectrum band of interest during one slot,
[24] proposes a fingerprints-power-belief based noncentral
detection algorithm through making power estimation and
calculating the compatibility in a distributed manner. On
the other side, few works have been done for the rogue
power emission problem. In [20], crowdsourced enforcement,
where a crowd of mobile users collaterally make detection,
is exploited to find out the spectrum misuse behavior and the
related characteristics, e.g., the signal strength, are analyzed.
In fact, one basic but vital problem is that the detectors gen-
erally have no ground truth of either the legitimate exploitation
or misuse behaviors. Hence, in this paper, we focus on two
new features about the sensing model:
• From binary-hypothesis to multi-hypothesis: We not only
identify whether the spectrum band is occupied or not, but
also have to make clear whether the band, if occupied, is
occupied legitimately or illegitimately. Due to lack of the
ground truth about the LU’s behaviors, the traditionally
binary-hypothesis test model is inaccurate to characterize
the new problem any more. Hence, considering the prob-
abilistic coexistence of the IU and the LU, it is essential
to formulate the detection problem as a multi-hypothesis
test problem.
• From simple hypothesis to composite hypothesis: From
the perspective of protecting itself from being detected,
the IU may behave in an intermittent and fast-changing
manner. As a result, it is hard to obtain the accurate
parameters of the IU, such as the transmit power and
channel gains, which means that the composite hypothe-
ses with a family of distributions are needed to formulate
the behaviors instead of simple ones with a single distri-
bution.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there is no work
considering the detection of spectrum misuse behaviors as
a multi-hypothesis test consisting of simple hypotheses and
composite hypotheses, though multiple hypotheses and com-
posite hypotheses have been separately considered in current
work about spectrum sensing. In [26], the case that the licensed
user works on more than one discrete transmit power levels
is considered and a multi-hypothesis test is made to detect
the existence of the signal and recognize the power levels
based on the maximum a posterior rule. Further, for the
same multi-power-level case, a sequential detection is studied
based on the modified Neyman-Pearson (NP) rule in [27].
As the transmit power levels are deterministic and known
for the sensors, all hypotheses are simple. However, when
some key parameters are unknown, the hypothesis becomes
composite. In [28], a two-sided parameter testing problem
is analyzed, where the user’s transmitting power and the
position are unknown, and a generalized Rao test is derived
for the binary hypothesis test consisting of a simple hypothesis
and a composite one. Nevertheless, this paper formulates a
different multiple hypothesis test, which consists of composite
hypotheses and simple ones, and the problem is complex and
hard to obtain an optimal scheme.
C. Contributions
In this paper, a distributed detection framework is built,
where every sensor makes spectrum sensing and local deci-
sion, and based on the decisions received from the sensors,
the FC makes data fusion and global decision, just as shown
in Fig. 1. Our aim is to detect whether the channel is occupied,
and if it is occupied, recognize whether the IU exists. The main
contributions are summarized as follows:
• We firstly formulate the spectrum sensing problem under
illegitimate access and rogue power emission as multi-
hypothesis tests, respectively, where the states without
the IU are modeled as simple hypotheses and the states
with the IU are modeled as composite ones due to the
unknown characteristics about the IU, and give a uniform
model for the two cases, i.e., a ternary hypothesis test,
through certain transformation to facilitate the analysis
and processing.
• We propose a generalized multi-hypothesis Neyman-
Pearson (GMNP) criterion and derive the test rule. Specif-
ically, in the GMNP criterion, the detection probability
about spectrum misuse behaviors is maximized under
two constraints about the detection probabilities of states
without the IU. Following the criterion, two test rules are
derived based on the GLRT and the Rao test, respectively.
In particular, due to the multi-hypothesis characteristic,
the overlapping problem of decision regions is analyzed
and the solution is given. To evaluate the proposed
schemes, the asymptotic performance is derived and an
upper bound of the detection performance is also given.
• We design a cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) scheme
for the ternary hypothesis test based on the global GMNP
3TABLE I: Key notations and symbols used in this paper.
Symbol Definition
LU The legitimate user
IU The illegitimate user
Pr(·) the probability of certain event
F (·) the probability distribution function ofcertain parameter
p(·) the probability density function of certainparameter
Hi the hypothesis Hi, i ∈ {0, 1, 2}
Ri the corresponding decision region of Hi
N the number of samples
K the number of sensors
test criterion. Due to the unknown detection performance
when the IU exists, the criterion is further transformed,
based on which a data fusion-based CSS algorithm is
developed.
• We present in-depth simulations to verify the detection
performance versus the unknown parameter, the number
of sensors, and the number of samples in two scenarios:
sensing with one single sensor and sensing with multiple
sensors.
Notably, the proposed method can handle with both ille-
gitimate access and rogue power control from the perspective
of spectrum sensing. Considering that current works focus on
either the illegitimate access or rogue power control, our work
shows high efficiency.
D. Organization and Notation
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The system
model under spectrum misuse behaviors is formulated in
Section II. Section III formulates the GMNP criterion, derives
the test rule, and gives an upper bound of the detection
performance. Cooperative spectrum sensing is analyzed in
Section IV. Simulation is given in Section V, followed by the
conclusion in Section VI. The proofs of all theorems are given
in the appendix. To facilitate the reading, the key notations are
summarized in Table I.
II. SYSTEM MODEL UNDER SPECTRUM MISUSE
BEHAVIORS
A. Problem Formulation
Conventionally, to detect whether a LU is transmitting
signals in a given spectrum band, a binary hypotheses test is
carried out between the null hypothesis L0 (the LU is absent)
and the alternative hypothesis L1 (the LU is present) [30]:
L0 : yL(t) = n(t),
L1 : yL(t) =
√
Pss(t) + n(t),
(1)
where yL(t) is the received signal of a sensor in time slot t,
s(t) is the signal transmitted by the LU, Ps is the received
power that is related with the transmit power and the path
loss and invariable during the observation time, and n(t) is
the additive Gaussian white noise with the variance σ2n.
Further, to facilitate the analysis, in the following, s(t)
is assumed to be an independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) random process with zero mean and unit variance, i.e.,
s(t) ∼ N (0, 1) [23] [31]. Here, Ps and σ2n are assumed to
be prior known, and it is considered from two aspects: it is
wise for the LU to provide some information (such as the
transmit power and statistical channel state) to assist sensors
of well finding out the mis-behaved IU [12]; considering
the LU’s regularity compared with the IU’s burstiness, it
is feasible to estimate the received power Ps of the LU
and the noise σ2n over a long observation. Hence, in L1,
yL(t) ∼ N (0, Ps + σ2n). Over a sensing slot T , the sensor
obtains N samples, y = (y0, y1, ..., yN ), based on which the
test is done.
Next, we analyze two cases of spectrum misuse behaviors,
illegitimate access and rogue power control, respectively.
1) Illegitimate access: In this case, the IU is an unau-
thorized user taking illegitimate access, and another binary
hypotheses test about the IU can be modeled as follows:
I0 : yI(t) = 0, if no IU exists;
I1 : yI(t) =
√
Pxx(t), if an IU exists.
(2)
where yI(t) is the illegitimate component in the received
signal, and x(t) is the signal transmitted by the IU with
the received power Px. As the IU always imitates the signal
characteristics of the LU to hide itself from being detected,
x(t) is also assumed to be an i.i.d. random process with zero
mean and unit variance, i.e., x(t) ∼ N (0, 1). In addition, as
the IU generally works abruptly in a non-cooperative manner
with the detection system in order to better hide itself from
being detected, Px is hard to obtain. Nevertheless, considering
the short sensing time and the ignorable, Px is assumed to be
invariable during one sensing slot. Furthermore, let P (Li) and
P (Ij), i, j ∈ {0, 1}, denote the prior probabilities about the
existence of the LU and the IU, respectively. We have
Pr(Li, Ii) = P (Li) Pr(Ii|Li). (3)
Remark. The dependence of the IU’s states and the LU’s
states varies with different goals and the prior information.
In the case that the IU aims to well exploit the spectrum for
free, e.g., the PUE attack, it prefers to work when the LU is
absent and Pr(I1|L0) may be higher than Pr(I1|L1). While
in another case that the IU’s goal is to deteriorate normal
communication of the LU, e.g., the jamming attack, Pr(I1|L1)
may be higher than Pr(I1|L0). However, it is generally hard to
obtain accurate information about the states of the LU for the
IU. In an extreme case that there is no information about the
real state of the LU, the IU has to work completely randomly
and independently, i.e., Pr(Li, Ii) = P (Ii)P (Li).
2) Rogue power control: In this case, the IU is the au-
thorized user working with a lower or higher transmit power
than the quoted value, and the corresponding state can be
formulated as follows:
L2 : yL(t) =
√
δ · Pss(t) + n(t), δ ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,∞). (4)
The metric δ reflects the tendency of the IU and the seriousness
of the illegitimate behaviors. δ > 1 indicates that the IU aims
4to enhance its own communication and bring the neighbors
more interference, while δ < 1 indicates that the IU aims to
occupy the channel over a large area and prevent other users
of taking access to the channel in the area.
It is noted that in this case, only one user exists. If the user
is working on the channel, it is either the LU or the IU during
one slot. It is different from the case of illegitimate access, in
which the LU and the IU are two entities. This difference will
be apparently reflected in the modeling process below.
B. Preliminary Spectrum Sensing Model: Composite Hypoth-
esis Tests
1) Spectrum sensing model under illegitimate access:
Considering the probabilistic co-existence of the LU and the
IU, the spectrum sensing problem under illegitimate access
behaviors is formulated as a quaternary hypothesis test:
S0 : y(t) = n(t),
S1 : y(t) =
√
Pss(t) + n(t),
S2 : y(t) =
√
Pxx(t) + n(t),
S3 : y(t) =
√
Pss(t) +
√
Pxx(t) + n(t),
(5)
where S0, S1, S2, and S3 denote the states that no users exist,
only the LU exists, only the IU exists, and the IU and the LU
co-exist, respectively, and y(t) is the observation of a certain
sensor at the t-th slot.
Based on the signal characteristics, the difference among the
hypotheses, in the view of the sensor, is the observation value’s
variance. Specifically, y ∼ N (0, σ2), where the parameter σ2
is σ2n, (Ps + σ
2
n), (Px + σ
2
n), and (Ps + Px + σ
2
n), under the
hypotheses S0, S1, S2, and S3, respectively. Notably, Px is
unknown and due to the superposition of the LU’s signal and
the IU’s signal in S3, we have σ2 > σ21 . Hence, the test can
be rewritten as follows:
S0 : σ2 = σ20 ,
S1 : σ2 = σ21 ,
S2 : σ2 > σ20 and σ2 6= σ21 ,
S3 : σ2 > σ21 ,
(6)
where σ20 = σ
2
n, σ
2
1 = Ps + σ
2
n. Here, S0 and S1 are simple
hypotheses whose parameter is a single value, while S2 and
S3 are composite ones whose parameter’s value space is a set.
In S2, σ2 6= σ21 is set to distinguish S2 from S1. In fact, in
S2, the value of σ2 is continuous so that the probability of
σ2 = σ21 is zero, which means that it poses few effects on the
results of the test.
Furthermore, let p(Px) denote the probability density func-
tion of the received power from the IU. Then, the probability
distribution function F (σ2) of the variance σ2 is
F (σ2) =

0, σ2 < σ20 ,
a00, σ
2 = σ20 ,
a00 + a01
∫ σ2−σ20
0
p(Px)dPx, σ
2
0 < σ
2 < σ21 ,
a00 + a10 + a01
∫ σ21−σ20
0
p(Px)dPx, σ
2 = σ21 ,
F (σ21) + a11
∫ σ2−σ21
0
p(Px)dPx, σ
2 > σ21 ,
(7)
221
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2
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Fig. 2: Spectrum sensing under illegitimate access: A
quaternary-hypothesis test.
where aij = P (Li, Ij). Then, we have the probability density
function of the observation value:
p(yi) =
∫ +∞
σ20
1√
2piσ2
e−
y2i
2σ2 dF (σ2), (8)
where i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}.
2) Spectrum sensing model under the rogue power control:
Based on (1)(4), there are three channel states under the rogue
power control, and correspondingly, the spectrum sensing
problem can be modeled as a ternary hypothesis test:
L0 : σ2 = σ20 ,
L1 : σ2 = σ21 ,
L2 : σ2 = σ20 + δ(σ21 − σ20), δ ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,∞).
(9)
Here, both the metric δ and its distribution are unknown, which
means that the hypothesis L2 is composite.
3) Summary: The two cases are different in many aspects,
such as external/internal attacks, one/two entities entity, and
attack objectives. However, from the perspective of spectrum
sensing, the two kinds of spectrum misuse behaviors show
much similarity:
• Both the tests consist of simple hypotheses without the
IU and composite hypotheses with the IU.
• There are unknown parameters in both cases, i.e., the
received power from the IU Px and the metric δ, and
though the parameters are different, they pose effects on
spectrum sensing through the variances of the observa-
tions.
In the following, we will find that the two cases can be
uniformly modeled through certain reasonable transformation.
C. Uniform Spectrum Sensing Model: A Ternary Hypothesis
Test
Firstly, in the case of illegitimate access, though the qua-
ternary hypothesis test in (6) gives the general formulation
about the spectrum sensing problem under illegitimate access,
the prior knowledge, such as the prior probabilities and the
distribution of Px, is hard to obtain and the equations (7)(8)
cannot be calculated. Furthermore, the hypothesis S2 with the
variance σ2 > σ20 , σ
2 6= σ21 , and the hypothesis S3 with the
variance σ2 > σ21 are partly overlapping, just as shown in Fig.
2. As a result, it is hard to distinguish the two states.
To tackle the problems above, we transform the original
quaternary hypothesis test about the illegitimate access to a
ternary hypothesis test. The key rational is that our objective is
to detect whether the channel is occupied and if it is occupied,
5recognize whether the IU exists, where the first part is to find
out the spectrum holes, while the second part is to protect
the scare resource of spectrum from being used illegitimately.
To achieve the former part, S0 ought to be distinguished
from the other hypotheses, while to achieve the latter one,
the hypotheses S0 and S1 ought to be distinguish from the
other two hypotheses S2 and S3. Hence, the objective can be
achieved, even though the two hypotheses S2 and S3 are not
distinguished. That is to say, we can combine S2 and S3 in
one hypothesis, i.e., σ2 ∈ (σ20 , σ21) ∪ (σ21 ,+∞).
Here, we find that the new hypothesis in the case of
illegitimate access is identical to L2, i.e., the hypothesis of
the IU launching rogue power control. Consequently, the two
cases can be uniformly modeled as a ternary hypothesis test:
H0 : σ2 = σ20 ,
H1 : σ2 = σ21 ,
H2 : σ2 ∈ (σ20 , σ21) ∪ (σ21 ,+∞),
(10)
where the simple hypotheses H0 and H1 denote that the
channel is idle and the channel is occupied by the LU,
respectively, while the composite hypothesis H2 means that
the IU exists, in which the IU can launch illegitimate access
or rogue power control, and σ22 is used to denote the unknown
variance of the observation in H2.
III. THE GENERALIZED MULTI-HYPOTHESIS
NEYMAN-PEARSON CRITERION AND THE TEST RULE
In this section, based on the proposed ternary-hypothesis
testing model, a novel test criterion called the GMNP criterion
is proposed and the test rule is derived, which is decomposed
into two subproblems: a detection subproblem and a recog-
nition subproblem. Then, the mutual effects between the two
parts are analyzed. Finally, the upper bound of the detection
performance is derived with the prior knowledge of the range
of the unknown parameter.
A. The Generalized Multi-Hypothesis Neyman-Pearson Crite-
rion
In the ternary hypothesis model, not only the prior prob-
abilities are unknown, but also the prior distribution of σ22
is hard to obtain. Moreover, it is conflicting to improve the
detection probabilities of all hypotheses simultaneously. To
tackle these issues, we build an optimization criterion named
the generalized multi-hypothesis Neyman-Pearson (GMNP)
criterion, where the probability of correctly identifying misuse
behaviors, Pr(H2|H2), is maximized, subjected to the con-
straints on the detection probabilities about H0 and H1 (i.e.,
Pr(H0|H0) and Pr(H1|H1)), which is formulated as follows:
max
R0,R1,R2
Pr(H2|H2),
s.t.Pr(H0|H0) ≥ α,Pr(H1|H1) ≥ β,
(11)
where Pr(Hi|Hj), i, j ∈ {0, 1} denotes the probability of the
decision Hi being made when the real state is Hj , and α and
β are constants which play as the constraints on the basic test
performance, 0.5 < α < 1, 0.5 < β < 1. In addition, Ri
denotes the decision region of Hi, that is,
Pr(Hi|Hj) ,
∫
Ri
p(y;Hj)dy,
where p(y;Hj) is the probability density function of the
observation sequence y under Hj .
Furthermore, we equivalently simplify the optimization cri-
terion based on Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. The optimization criterion in (11) is equivalent to
the one below:
max
R0,R1,R2
Pr(H2|H2), (12a)
s.t.Pr(H0|H0) = α, (12b)
Pr(H1|H1) = β. (12c)
Remark. In the traditional Neyman-Pearson criterion of the
binary-hypothesis test, the detection probability about the
alternative hypothesis is maximized with the constraint of the
false alarm probability about the null hypothesis [32]. Hence,
the GMNP criterion in (11) and (12) can be regarded as an
extension of the Neyman-Pearson criterion in the generalized
multi-hypothesis test. Nevertheless, the main differences focus
on one point: the multi-hypothesis test encounters the compos-
ite hypothesis. Multiple hypotheses increases the complexity
of carving out the decision regions, while the composite
hypothesis raises its difficulty. In the following, we focus on
designing the test rule.
B. The Proposed Test Rule
Firstly, to maximize the detection probability about spec-
trum misuse behaviors under the given detection probabilities
of H0 and H1, we use the Lagrange multiplier method to
construct the objective function:
F = Pr(H2|H2)+λ0(Pr(H0|H0)−α)+λ1(Pr(H1|H1)−β).
(13)
Further, we have
F = 1−
∫
R0
p(y;H2)dy−
∫
R1
p(y;H2)dy
+ λ0(
∫
R0
p(y;H0)dy− α) + λ1(
∫
R1
p(y;H1)dy− β)
=
∫
R0
[λ0p(y;H0)− p(y;H2)]dy
+
∫
R1
[λ1p(y;H1)− p(y;H2)]dy + 1− λ0α− λ1β.
(14)
In (14), we find that to maximize F , in the decision regionR0,
λ0p(y;H0)− p(y;H2) > 0, while in the decision region R1,
λ1p(y;H1) − p(y;H2) > 0, where the two constants λ0 and
λ1 are decided to satisfy the constraints in (12). Furthermore,
6to maximize Pr(H2|H2), H2 is decided when
p(y;H2)
p(y;H0) > λ0, (15a)
p(y;H2)
p(y;H1) > λ1. (15b)
It is shown that to achieve the GMNP criterion in (11) and
(12), two likelihood ratios p(y;H2)p(y;H0) and
p(y;H2)
p(y;H1) are used in the
detection process. Put (12) and (15) together, and we find that
the constraint in (12b) is related to the former likelihood ratio
which includes H0 and H2, while the other constraint in (12c)
is related to the latter one which includes H1 and H2. Hence,
the optimization problem in (12) can be decomposed into two
subproblems, which are formulated as follows:
max
R0,R2
Pr(H2|H2),
s.t.Pr(H0|H0) = α,
(16)
and
max
R1,R2
Pr(H2|H2),
s.t.Pr(H1|H1) = β,
(17)
respectively, where the final solution of R2 is the intersection
of the solutions of the two subproblems. Hence, through the
decomposition above, we simplify the former problem. More
importantly, we find that the two subproblems have clear
physical significance, based on which the two subproblems
are named the detection subproblem and the recognition
subproblem.
1) Detection subproblem (Idle or busy): The first sub-
problem in (16) can be thought to stem from such a binary
hypothesis test:
H0 : σ2 = σ20 ,
H2 : σ2 > σ20 , and σ2 6= σ21 .
(18)
Let σ2 denote the variance of the observation value under
H2, and as σ22 > σ20 , this problem is single-side. Then, to
maximize Pr(H2|H2) while constraining Pr(H0|H0) to be α,
we exploit the likelihood ratio test (LRT):
L0(y) =
p(y;H2)
p(y;H0) =
1
(2piσ22)
N
2
exp(−
∑N−1
n=0 y
2
n
2σ22
)
1
(2piσ20)
N
2
exp(−
∑N−1
n=0 y
2
n
2σ20
)
=
(
σ20
σ22
)N
2
exp
(
σ22 − σ20
2σ20σ
2
2
∑N−1
n=0
y2n
)H2
R
H0
λ0. (19)
As y works in the manner of
∑N−1
n=0 y
2
n in (19), the test statistic
is Y =
∑N−1
n=0 y
2
n. L0(y) increases with Y , as σ
2
2 > σ
2
0 .
Hence, to make L0(y) < λ0 means that Y < η0, where η0
is the corresponding threshold to λ0. Further, under H0, Y =∑N−1
n=0 y
2
n ∼ χ2N (σ20). Hence, we have
Pr(H0|H0) = Pr(Y < η0|H0) = 1−
Γ(N2 ,
η0
σ20
)
Γ(N2 )
= α, (20)
where Γ(·) and Γ(·, ·) are the Gamma function and upper
incomplete Gamma function, respectively. Hence, the decision
threshold is derived as
η0 = Γ
−1
(
N
2
, (1− α) Γ(N
2
)
)
σ20 , (21)
where Γ−1(·, ·) is the inverse incomplete Gamma function.
Hence, the test rule for the detection subproblem is
Y
H2
R
H0
η0. (22)
2) Recognition subproblem (Legitimate or illegitimate):
The second subproblem (17) can be thought to stem from
such a binary hypothesis test:
H1 : σ2 = σ21 ,
H2 : σ2 > σ20 , and σ2 6= σ21 .
(23)
Different from the detection subproblem, the recognition
subproblem is double-side, i.e., the unknown variance σ22 may
be either higher or lower than σ21 . Next, we apply the GLRT to
tackle with the double-side problem. Then, asymptotic analysis
is made about the detection performance. To bypass the
complexity of obtaining the thresholds in the GLRT, another
scheme, i.e., the Rao test, is also derived.
a) GLRT: First, we calculate the unknown variance’s
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) σˆ22 of σ
2
2 :
σˆ22 = arg max
σ22
p(y;σ22). (24)
Let ∂p(y;σˆ
2
2)
∂σˆ22
= 0, and we have
σˆ22 =
1
N
∑N−1
n=0
y2n. (25)
Further, we have the likelihood ratio
L1 =
p(y; σˆ22 ,H2)
p(y;H1)
=
(
Nσ21∑N−1
n=0 y
2
n
)N
2
exp
(∑N−1
n=0 y
2
n
2σ21
− N
2
)
H2
R
H1
λ1. (26)
As the test statistic Y is
∑N−1
n=0 y
2
n, L1 is the function of Y
and we have
dL1
dY
=
1
2
(
N
σ21
Y
)N
2
e
Y
2σ21
Y −Nσ21
Y σ21
. (27)
Therefore, when Y > Nσ21 , L1 increases with Y ; otherwise,
L1 decreases with Y . Hence, the minimum of the likelihood
ratio is achieved at Nσ21 and λ1 > 1. Thus, L1 < λ1 is
equivalent to η1 < Y < η2, where η1 and η2 are two solutions
of L1(Y ) = λ1, i.e.,(
Nσ21
η1
)N
2
exp(
η1
2σ21
− N
2
) =
(
Nσ21
η2
)N
2
exp
(
η2
2σ21
− N
2
)
= λ1. (28)
7Simultaneously, when only the LU does exist, i.e., H1, Y =∑N−1
n=0 y
2
n ∼ χ2N (σ21) and the condition below is satisfied:
Pr(H1|H1) = Pr(η1 < Y < η2) =
Γ(N2 ,
η1
σ21
)− Γ(N2 , η2σ21 )
Γ(N2 )
= β. (29)
Hence, based on (28) and (37), the two thresholds η1 and η2
can be obtained. Finally, the test rule in this part is formulated
as follows: { H1 is declared, if η1 < Y < η2,
H2 is declared, otherwise. (30)
b) Asymptotic analysis: Considering the complexity of
the GLRT, the thresholds are hard to be formulated in the
closed-form manner. Nevertheless, when the number of sam-
ples is sufficiently large, some approximation can be made and
the asymptotic performance (i.e., N →∞) is analyzed.
Proposition 1. When N is sufficiently large and the channel
is occupied by the LU, we have 2 lnL1
a∼χ21.
Then, let z2 = 2 lnL1, where z follows a Gaussian
distribution with mean zero and variance 1, i.e., z ∼ N (0, 1),
and we have
Pr(H1|H1) a= Pr(2 lnL1 < 2 lnλ1|H1)
=
∫ √2 lnλ1
−√2 lnλ1
1√
2pi
ρ
z2
2 dz
= 2Q(−
√
2 lnλ1)− 1 = β, (31)
where Q(·) is the complementary distribution function of
the standard Gaussian. Hence, we can obtain the asymptotic
solution of λ1 as follows
λ1
a
= exp
[
1
2
(
Q−1(
1 + β
2
)
)2]
. (32)
In addition, based on (28), the approximate values of η1 and
η2 are obtained.
Though the complexity of calculating the thresholds de-
creases, we still cannot obtain the closed-form expressions
of the thresholds, which makes it not easy to evaluate the
test performance. Nevertheless, we make another proposition
below so that we can evaluate the asymptotic performance.
Proposition 2. When N is sufficiently large and the hypothesis
H2 is true, z2 = 2 lnL1(y) a∼χ′21(θ), z ∼ N (
√
θ, 1), where
χ
′2
1(θ) is a noncentral chi-square distribution with the noncen-
tral parameter θ = (σ22 − σ21)2I(σ21), and I(σ21) is the Fisher
information. Specifically, the Fisher information is calculated
below:
I(σ21) = −E
(
∂2 ln p(y;σ21)
∂2σ21
)
= −E
(
∂
∂σ21
(∑N−1
i=0 y
2
i
2σ41
− N
2σ21
))
= −E
(
N
2σ41
−
∑N−1
i=0 y
2
i
σ61
)
=
N
2σ41
. (33)
Then, we have z ∼ N (µ, 1), µ =
√
(
σ22
σ21
− 1)2N2 . Hence,
the asymptotic probability of H2 being wrongly detected as
H1 is
Pr(H1|H2) a= Pr(−
√
2 lnλ1 < z <
√
2 lnλ1|H2)
= Pr(Q−1(
1 + β
2
) < z < −Q−1(1 + β
2
)|H2)
=
∫ −Q−1( 1+β2 )
Q−1( 1+β2 )
1√
2pi
e−
(z−µ)2
2 dz. (34)
Here, 2 lnλ1 =
(
Q−1( 1+β2 )
)2
based on (32), and as β < 1,
0.5 < 1+β2 < 1, Q
−1( 1+β2 ) < 0. So,
√
2 lnλ1 = −Q−1( 1+β2 ).
c) Rao test: The Rao test has the same asymptotic
performance with the GLRT, but it has a lower computation
complexity, as the elements are easy to computed. So, we give
the Rao test as follows:
TR(y) =
∂ ln p(y;σ2)
∂σ2
∣∣∣∣2
σ2=σ21
I−1(σ21)
=
(∑N−1
n=0 y
2
n −Nσ21
2σ41
)2
2σ41
N
=
(∑N−1
n=0 y
2
n −Nσ21
)2
2Nσ41
H2
R
H1
λR1 . (35)
Then, the two thresholds ηR1 and η
R
2 about the test statistic Y
are formulated: {
ηR1 = (N −
√
2NλR1 )σ
2
1 ,
ηR2 = (N +
√
2NλR1 )σ
2
1 .
(36)
Simultaneously, we have
Pr(H1|H1) = Pr(ηR1 < Y < ηR2 )
=
Γ(N2 ,
ηR1
σ21
)− Γ(N2 , η
R
2
σ21
)
Γ(N2 )
= β. (37)
Based on (36) and (37), the Rao test is built.
3) Mutual effects between the two subproblems: When the
GLRT is applied, based on (22) and (30), the decision regions
are obtained about the test statistic Y =
∑N−1
n=0 y
2
n:
Ri :=
 Y < η0, i = 0,η1 < Y < η2, i = 1,
η0 < Y < η1, or Y > η2, i = 2,
(39)
where R2 is an intersection of the decision regions about H2
in the two subproblems (22) and (30) in order to satisfy the
constraints. When the Rao test is applied, substitute ηR1 and
ηR2 for η1 and η2 in (39), respectively, and we can obtain the
corresponding decision regions.
In (39), one problem exists, i.e., η1 may be lower than η0.
It means that there is one overlapping region between R0 and
R1 and the constraints are not satisfied any more. It is true
when the performance parameters α and β satisfy a certain
condition, just as shown in Theorem 1 below.
Theorem 1. If the GLRT is applied, the overlapping happens
between the decision regionsR0 andR1, when the parameters
8Pr(H2|H2) = 1− Pr(H1|H2)− Pr(H0|H2)
a
= 1−
[
Q
(
Q−1(
1 + β
2
)− µ
)
−Q
(
−Q−1(1 + β
2
)− µ
)]
−
(
1−
Γ(N2 ,
η0
σ22
)
Γ(N2 )
)
=
Γ(N2 ,
η0
σ22
)
Γ(N2 )
−
[
Q
(
Q−1(
1 + β
2
)− µ
)
−Q
(
−Q−1(1 + β
2
)− µ
)]
, (38)
α and β satisfy such a condition:
β >
Γ(N2 ,
η∗1
σ21
)
Γ(N2 )
−
Γ(N2 ,
η∗2
σ21
)
Γ(N2 )
, (40)
where η∗1 = Γ
−1(N2 , (1 − α)Γ(N2 ))σ20 , η∗2 is a solution to
(
η∗1
η∗2
)
N
2 exp(
η∗2−η∗1
2σ21
) = 1, and η∗2 6= η∗1 .
When the condition is not satisfied in Theorem 1, i.e., there
are no mutual effects between the two subproblems, based on
(34), we can obtain the asymptotic value of Pr(H2|H2) just
as formulated in (38), where Pr(H0|H2) is obtained based
on (20). As µ > 0 and µ increases with the number of
samples N , Pr(H1|H2) decreases with N . Simultaneously,
Pr(H0|H2) decreases with N . Hence, as N goes to infinity,
∀σ22 > σ20 , σ22 6= σ21 , Pr(H2|H2)→ 1.
On the other side, when the overlapping happens, we have to
adjust the decision regions to avoid the overlapping and satisfy
the constraints. Go back to (14), and to satisfy the constraints,
the two thresholds λ0 and λ1 ought to be raised. However, as
the overlapping has happened, the result of leveraging λ0 is
that η0 increases in (19) and the overlapping area is enlarged,
which shows no help for satisfying the constraints, while both
η1 and η2 increase with λ1 in (28) and the decision region R1
is enlarged. So, when the condition is satisfied in Theorem 1,
η1 is set to be equal to η0 so that the constraint Pr(H0|H0) =
α is satisfied, and to satisfy
Pr(H1|H1) =
Γ(N2 ,
η1
σ21
)
Γ(N2 )
−
Γ(N2 ,
η2
σ21
)
Γ(N2 )
= β, (41)
η2 is reformulated as follows:
η2 = Γ
−1
(
N
2
,Γ(
N
2
,
η1
σ21
)− Γ(N
2
)β
)
σ21 . (42)
As a result, the decision region is reformulated as follows:
Ri :=
 Y < η0, i = 0,η1 < Y < η2, i = 1,
Y > η2, i = 2,
(43)
where η0 is calculated based on (21), η1 = η0, and η2 is
calculated based on (42).
Theorem 2. If the Rao test is applied in the recognition part,
the overlapping happens between the decision regions R0 and
R1, when the parameters α and β satisfy such a condition:
β >
Γ(N2 ,
ηr1
σ21
)
Γ(N2 )
−
Γ(N2 ,
ηr2
σ21
)
Γ(N2 )
, (44)
where ηr1 = Γ
−1(N2 , (1−α)Γ(N2 ))σ20 , and ηr2 = 2Nσ21 − ηr1 .
When the overlapping happens, the analysis results are
consistent with that when the GLRT is applied and the decision
region is given in (43).
Remark. In conclusion, there are two cases (no overlapping
happens/ the overlapping happens) in the process of designing
the test rule and correspondingly, the decision regions are
given in (39) and (43), respectively. It can be found in Theorem
1 that the overlapping happens when the constraints are rigid,
i.e., α and β are high. As a result, the decision region of H2
is compressed. Essentially, it is due to the multi-hypothesis
characteristic of the test and there is a tradeoff between
the optimization objective and the constraints, which will
be analyzed in the following simulations (see Section V for
details). Similar to the proposed rule, the generalized max-
imized likelihood (ML) rule also works in cases without the
prior knowledge and makes the detection relying on estimation
of related parameters [29]. One key difference between the
generalized ML rule and the proposed rule is what detection
criterion is applied. The generalized ML rule is to minimize
the error probability, while the proposed rule aims to achieve
the proposed GMNP criterion, in which the probability of cor-
rectly identifying misuse behaviors, Pr(H2|H2), is maximized,
subjected to the constraints on the detection probabilities
about H0 and H1 (i.e., Pr(H0|H0) and Pr(H1|H1)).
C. An Upper Bound of the Detection Performance: When the
Range of the Unknown Variance is Known
In this subsection, to further evaluate the performance of
the proposed test rule, the prior knowledge about the range
of the unknown variance σ22 is given and the corresponding
test rule is derived, which can be regard as an upper bound
of the detection performance following the GMNP criterion.
Here, the range of σ22 means whether σ
2
2 is higher than σ
2
1 ,
and when the range of σ22 is known, the recognition problem
turns from a double-side detection to a single-side detection.
The test rule is given below.
Theorem 3. When the range of σ22 , i.e., whether σ22 > σ21 or
σ20 < σ
2
2 < σ
2
1 is true, is known, the decision region about the
test statistic Y =
∑N−1
n=0 y
2
n is given as follows:
Case 1: σ20 < σ
2
2 < σ
2
1
Ri :=
 Y < η0, i = 0,Y > η1, i = 1,
η0 < Y < η1, i = 2,
(45)
9where η0 = Γ−1(N2 , (1 − α)Γ(N2 ))σ20 , and η1 =
Γ−1(N2 , βΓ(
N
2 ))σ
2
1 .
Case 2: σ22 > σ
2
1
Ri :=
 Y < η0, i = 0,η0 < Y < η1, i = 1,
Y > η1, i = 2,
(46)
where η0 = Γ−1(N2 , (1 − α)Γ(N2 ))σ20 , and η1 =
Γ−1(N2 ,Γ(
N
2 ,
η0
σ21
)− βΓ(N2 ))σ21 .
IV. COOPERATIVE SPECTRUM SENSING UNDER
SPECTRUM MISUSE BEHAVIORS
In this section, to further improve the detection performance,
cooperative spectrum sensing [33], [34] is conducted based on
a distributed detection framework, where there are K sensors
and a FC. To decrease the communication cost, sensors report
local decisions to the FC in which data fusion-based global de-
cision is made. We consider that the reporting channel is ideal
and the decisions are correctly received by the FC. Here, let rk
and r denote the report of the k-th sensor, rk ∈ {H0,H1,H2},
and the whole reports, i.e., r = [r1, r2, ..., rK ], respectively,
where sensors’ reports are considered to be conditionally
independent.
Next, the FC makes data fusion-based global decision,
denoted as D. First of all, the global GMNP criterion is built
to maximize the global probability of the IU being correctly
detected under the constraints about the detection probabilities
of H0 and H1:
max Pr(D =H2|H2),
s.t. Pr(D = H0|H0) > αf ,Pr(D = H1|H1) > βf ,
(47)
where α < αf < 1, α < βf < 1. Then, the problem is what
global decision is made when certain combination of reports
r is received.
Proposition 3. When the distances between sensors are small
enough compared with the distances from the sensors to the
IU and LU, it is reasonable to consider that all sensors have
identical sensing performance. Then, the reports r can be
simply denoted as d = (d0, d1, d2), where di is the number of
sensors who claim Hi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Here, d0 + d1 + d2 = K,
and the total number of possible d is L =
(
K + 2
2
)
=
(K+2)(K+1)
2 . Then, we have
Pr(d|Hi) =
(
K
d0
)
Pr (H0|Hi)d0 ×
(
K − d0
d1
)
Pr (H1|Hi)d1 ×
(
K − d0 − d1
d2
)
Pr (H2|Hi)d2
=
K!
2∏
n=0
dn!
2∏
j=0
Pr (Hj |Hi)dj . (48)
The global decision is to make choices among H0, H1,
and H2 for a certain d. Let Si, denote the set of d in
which the decision Hi is made, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, where the sets
S0, S1, S2 are complete and mutually exclusive. Therefore,
from the perspective of optimizing the global decision, the
global criterion in (47) can be rewritten as follows:
max
S0,S1,S2
∑
d∈S2
Pr(d|H2),
s.t.
∑
d∈S0
Pr(d|H0) > αf ,
∑
d∈S1
Pr(d|H1) > βf .
(49)
Further, as Pr(Hi|Hj), i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, j ∈ {0, 1} is known
based on the local thresholds, Pr(d|Hj), j ∈ {0, 1} can be
calculated based on (48), which means that we can find the
sets who satisfy the constraints. Nevertheless, as Pr(Hi|H2)
is unknown, Pr(d|H2) cannot be obtained. That is, we cannot
directly pick out the optimal solution (S∗0 , S
∗
1 , S
∗
2 ) among the
ones who satisfy the constraints. Further, we find that the
number of elements in the decision region S2 can reflect
the optimization objective in Eq. (47), i.e., Pr(D = H2|H2),
which is based on two points:
• As the number of possible d is L = (K+2)(K+1)2 , where
K is the number of sensors, the value space is separated
into L pieces and the decision regions S0, S1, and S2
consist of certain numbers of pieces. Clearly, L increases
quadratically with K and when L is large enough, the
number of pieces in the decision region, to some degree,
represents the corresponding detection probability.
• In general, for certain d, the higher the probabilities
Pr(d|H0) and Pr(d|H1) are, the lower Pr(d|H2) is, and
vice versa. In the process of satisfying the constraints,
through maximizing the number of elements in S2, d with
high Pr(d|H2) is left behind for S2, which is consistent
with the optimization objective.
Hence, we prefer to choose the solution in which S2 has
more elements, in order to maximize the detection probability
Pr(H2|H2) based on (49). Hence, the optimization problem
in (49) is approximately transformed into
max
S0,S1
|S2|,
s.t.
∑
d∈S0
Pr(d|H0) > αf ,∑
d∈S1
Pr(d|H1) > βf ,
|S0|+ |S1|+ |S2| = (K + 2)(K + 1)
2
,
(50)
where |Si| denotes the number of elements in the set Si.
Number all the possible combinations d, and use d(i) to
denote the ith one, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., L}. Let Y denote a L × 3
array, where if d(i) is included in the set Sj , yij = 1 and
otherwise, yij = 0. Then, the optimization problem in (50)
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can be reformulated equivalently as follows:
min
Y
L∑
i=1
(yi1 + yi2),
s.t.
L∑
i=1
yi1 · ci1 ≥ αf ,
L∑
i=1
yi2 · ci2 ≥ βf ,
yi1 + yi2 ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, 2, ..., L,
yij ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, 2, ..., L, j = 1, 2,
(51)
where ci1 and ci2 denote Pr(d(i)|H0) and Pr(d(i)|H1), re-
spectively. This problem is that of integer linear programming
(ILP), while the ILP is NP-hard. Hence, the challenge is how
to effectively make the assignment about d between H0 and
H1 in order to satisfy the constraints.
Intuitively, to satisfy the constraints while maximizing
|S2|, d with high probabilities Pr(d|H0) and Pr(d|H1) are
assigned to S0 and S1, respectively. Nevertheless, the two
processes cannot be done independently, as there are potential
collisions between them, i.e., there may be some d belonging
to both S0 and S1. Therefore, we set a rule, in which d is
assigned to the hypothesis with a higher probability when the
collision happens, and give Algorithm 1. Specifically, in the
beginning, S0, S1, and S2 are empty, use Ω to denote the
whole set of d, and U = Ω − S0
⋃
S1. Then, independently,
d in U is assigned to S0 and S1 in the descending orders of
Pr(d|H0) and Pr(d|H0), respectively, until the constraints are
satisfied (Line 11-18 in Algorithm 1). Let X = S0 ∩ S1 and
use x(i) to denote the ith element in X . If X 6= ∅, compare
Pr(x(i)|H0) and Pr(x(i)|H1), x(i) is abandoned by the set
with a lower probabilities (Line 20-28 in Algorithm 1), and
then return to Line 10 to continue until X is empty. When the
iteration ends, S2 = Ω− S0
⋃
S1.
Finally, it is pointed out that the algorithm’s optimality is
closely related to the constraints and when the constraints, i.e.,
αf and βf , are not too high, the algorithm is optimal for (51).
Specifically, in Algorithm 1, we find that when the constraints
are not too high, no collision happens so that all the elements
in S0 and S1 are obtained based on the descending orders
of Pr(d|H0) and Pr(d|H1), respectively, and as a result,
|S0| + |S1| obtains the smallest value so that the optimal S2
is achieved. However, as the constraints increase, collisions
increase and the performance may decrease.
V. SIMULATIONS
A. Basic Simulation Setup
In the following, we consider an IEEE 802.22 simulation
environment [35]. An LU (e.g., an advanced base station) is
located at the origin (0 m, 0 m) and K sensors are randomly
distributed in a 100 m × 100 m square area with the center
at (10 km, 0 m). The bandwidth of the spectrum band is
6 MHz. The IU (e.g., an illegitimate broadcast station) is
located randomly and it is over 1000 m away from the
sensors. Without special statement, the number of samples is
Algorithm 1 The Cooperative Spectrum Sensing under Spec-
trum Misuse Behaviors
1: //Local decision
2: if The condition (40) about α and β is satisfied, i.e., the
overlapping happens, then
3: Calculate η0 and η2 based on (21) and (42), respectively,
η1 ← η0, and make local decisions based on (43).
4: else
5: Calculate the thresholds based on (21), (28), and (37)
and make decisions based on (39).
6: end if
7: //Data fusion and global decision
8: S0 ← ∅, S1 ← ∅, S2 ← ∅, Ω ← {d(1),d(2), ...,d(L)},
X ← Ω
9: while X 6= ∅ do
10: U = Ω− S0
⋃
S1, U0 ← U , U1 ← U
11: while
∑
d∈S0
Pr(d|H0) < αf do
12: d∗ ← arg max
d∈U0
Pr(d|H0)
13: S0 ← S0 ∪ d, U0 ← U0 − d
14: end while
15: while
∑
d∈S1
Pr(d|H1) < βf do
16: d∗ ← arg max
d∈U1
Pr(d|H1)
17: S1 ← S1 ∪ d, U1 ← U1 − d
18: end while
19: X ← S0
⋂
S1, Nx ← |X|
20: if Nx 6= 0 then
21: for i = 1, ..., Nx do
22: if Pr(x(i)|H0) > Pr(x(i)|H1) then
23: S1 ← S1 − x(i)
24: else
25: S0 ← S0 − x(i)
26: end if
27: end for
28: end if
29: end while
30: S2 ← Ω− S0 − S1.
N = 300, which corresponds to the sampling time 0.05 ms,
and the number of sensors is K = 20. The noise variance is
σ2n = 10
−5 Watt. The ratio of the received power from the
LU Ps to the noise variance at (10 km, 0 m) is set as -5dB.
Sensors make ternary decisions and report the results to the
FC, in which reports are fused and global decisions are made
based on the proposed algorithm.
B. Sensing with a Single Sensor
To evaluate the performance with a single sensor, four
schemes are included in the following simulations:
• The scheme given in Theorem 3, named Upper bound,
where the information on the prior range of the variance
σ22 is exploited in the test.
• The proposed scheme named P-GLRT, where the GLRT
is exploited in the recognition part.
• The proposed scheme named P-Rao, where the Rao test
is exploited in the recognition part.
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Fig. 3: The probability of a single sensor correctly detecting
the existence of the IU versus the unknown variance σ22 . α
and β are set to 0.8.
• The scheme named Asymptotic performance given in
(38), which is obtained through asymptotic analysis about
sensing performance with a single sensor of both P-GLRT
and P-Rao.
Fig. 3 illustrates the performance of a single sensor cor-
rectly detecting the existence of the IU versus the unknown
parameter σ22 . With the assistance of the prior knowledge
about the range of the variance σ22 , the double-side detection
is simplified as a single-side one and the upper bound of
the detection performance is obtained. Hence, it is observed
that the upper bound shows apparently higher performance
than the other schemes. The two proposed schemes, P-GLRT
and P-Rao, show similar performances and the asymptotic
performance is close to these of the two proposed schemes,
as the number of samples N is 300, which is sufficiently
large. More importantly, when σ22 approaches either σ
2
0 or
σ21 , the detection performances of all schemes deteriorate
and the gaps between the schemes are shorten. That is, it
becomes hard to distinguish H2 from either H0 or H1, which
is due to the high similarity between the hypotheses from the
perspective of testing, which can be seen as the worst cases
that are determined by the constraints α and β. Hence, from
the perspective of properly improving the performance in the
worst cases, the constraints α and β cannot be set too high.
On the other side, when the distances from σ22 to σ
2
0 and σ
2
1
increase, the performances get better and in particular, when
σ22 is over σ
2
1 , the gaps gradually diminish.
As shown in Fig. 4, when the requirements about
Pr(H0|H0) and Pr(H1|H1) improve, i.e., α, β increase, the
probability of the IU being correctly detected decreases. It
is implied that a tradeoff has to be achieved when tackling
with detection of both the IU and the LU, which is similar
to the tradeoff between the false-alarm probability and the
detection probability in the traditional binary hypothesis test.
In addition, when α = β > 0.92, the mutual effects between
the detection part and the recognition part exist and the
asymptotic performance cannot be obtained so that its last
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Fig. 4: Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves:
Pr(H2|H2) versus Pr(H0|H0) and Pr(H1|H1), i.e., α and
β. Here, α = β, N = 300, and the ratio of the received power
from the IU Px to the noise variance is -3dB.
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Fig. 5: The detection probability Pr(H2|H2) versus the num-
ber of samples N . Here α = β = 0.8, and the ratio of the
received power from the IU Px to the noise variance is -3dB.
three points isn’t curved.
Fig. 5 shows the detection performances increases with the
number of samples N and the gaps gradually diminish. In
particular, when N increases from 300 to 600, the proposed
schemes’ detection probabilities improve by nearly 33 percent.
C. Sensing with Multiple Sensors
In Fig. 6, we find that cooperation between sensors can
greatly improve the detection performance, which is true
for detecting both the IU and the LU. Nevertheless, when
σ22 approaches σ
2
0 or σ
2
1 , the detection probability decreases
sharply, which is consistent to that when a single sensor makes
the test. On the other side, due to the cooperation, the gaps
between the schemes are narrowed and become almost zero,
when σ22 ranges from 1× 10−5 to 1.2× 10−5.
Fig. 7 shows that the global detection probability
Pr(H2|H2) decreases with αf and βf , where the P-GLRT
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Fig. 6: The global performance of correctly detecting the ex-
istence of the IU versus the unknown parameter σ22 . Here, the
number of samples N is 300, α = β = 0.85, αf = βf = 0.9
and K = 20.
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Fig. 7: ROC curves: Pr(H2|H2) versus the local constraints
and global ones about Pr(H0|H0) and Pr(H1|H1), i.e., (α,
β) and (αf , βf ). Here, α = β, αf = βf , N = 300, K = 20,
and the ratio of the received power from the IU to the noise
power is -3.5dB.
is exploited in each sensor. It is found that the cooperation
between sensors dramatically decreases the uncertainty of
detection. Simultaneously, for certain constraints (αf , βf ) and
a certain value of σ22 , there exist optimal local constraints
(α, β) which are not too low or too high just as shown in
Fig. 7. However, the optimal solution of (α, β) is hard to
obtain as it is related to the unknown variance σ22 . Here it
is needed to pointed out that when α and β are set over 0.95,
the local constraints cannot be satisfied any more, so we set
the detection performance to zero.
Fig. 8 shows that as the number of samples and the number
of sensors increase, the global detection probability increases.
Compared with Fig. 5, much fewer samples are needed to
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Fig. 8: The global detection probability Pr(H2|H2) versus
the number of samples N and the number of sensors K. Here
α = β = 0.85, αf = βf = 0.95, and the ratio of the received
power from the IU to the noise power is -3dB.
achieve a favorable performance due to cooperation of multiple
sensors. Further, increasing the number of samples is, in a
certain degree, equivalent to increasing the number of sensors,
where the former brings about a longer detection delay while
the latter one leads to a higher hardware cost. It is implied that
we ought to make appropriate choices between the number of
samples, i.e., the detection delay, and the number of sensors,
i.e., the hardware cost, in order to optimize the resources and
achieve the detection objective.
D. Two-step Approximation and Its Optimality
To further evaluate the global performance with multiple
sensors, in particular, the effectiveness of the two-step approx-
imation in the cooperative spectrum sensing (from Problem
(49) to Problem (51), and from Problem (51) to Algorithm 1),
three schemes are compared:
• An ideal scheme named Oracle about (49), where the
variance in H2, i.e., σ22 , is assumed to be known when
the global decision is done. In this scheme, Pr(d|H2) can
be calculated so that we can find the optimal solution to
maximize Pr(H2|H2) through exhaustive searching.
• The scheme of finding out the optimal solution about
(51), named Optimal about (51). We can obtain the
optimal solution for Problem (51) through exhaustive
searching, where the number of elements in S2 is maxi-
mized under the constraints.
• The heuristic scheme obtained by Algorithm 1, named
Algorithm 1.
Considering the closeness between the GLRT and Rao
test in term of the detection performance, without loss of
generality, in this subsection, GLRT is used in local decisions.
In addition, it is pointed out that for exhaustive searching, the
search space is huge and the computational complexity is high.
Specifically, the number of possible combinations [S0, S1, S2]
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Fig. 9: Pr(H2|H2) versus the constraints αf and βf under
different schemes. Here, σ21 = 1.2 × 10−5 Watt, σ22 = 1.4 ×
10−5 Watt, and K = 5.
is Nc =
L−2∑
i=1
L−i−1∑
j=1
CiLC
j
L−i, where C
m
n =
n!
m!(n−m)! , which
means that when the number of sensors K is 5, for example,
Nc = 1.0454× 1010. In contrast, the number of combinations
searched, in Algorithm 1, is no more than N2 . From this
perspective, the proposed heuristic algorithm is very necessary
to reduce the computational complexity significantly. Consid-
ering the high computational complexity related to the number
of sensors, the number of sensors are set to 5 in this subsection.
Moreover, we find that there may exist multiple solutions about
(51) which maximize |S2| while satisfying the constraints.
Generally, the higher Pr(H0|H0) + Pr(H1|H1) is, the lower
Pr(H2|H2) is, which is identical to part of the motivation of
obtaining (50) from (49). Hence, when this case happens, the
solution which maximizes Pr(H0|H0)+Pr(H1|H1) is chosen.
Fig. 9 depicts Pr(H2|H2) versus the constraints αf and βf
and shows the gaps between different schemes under different
local constraints. As expected, the detection performance de-
creases with the constraints. As the process of global decision
is an integer linear programming, the curve is non-smooth.
When αf and βf reaches some level, they cannot be satisfied
any more and Pr(H2|H2) is set to zero. We find that Algorithm
1 works closely with Optimal about (51) and Oracle about
(49) is better than the other two at certain intervals and keeps
similar performance at other intervals. The local constraints
work through controlling the probability distributions of d.
The higher the local constraints are, the more intensive the
probability distributions under H0 and H1 are and the more
dispersive the probability distribution under H2 is. Hence,
when the constraints changes from 0.75 to 0.8, the schemes
encounter relatively smooth declines with the increasing global
constraints.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the problem on the detection
of spectrum misuse behaviors brought by illegitimate access
or rogue power emission. To detect whether the channel is
occupied and recognize whether the illegitimate user exists,
we exploited the multi-hypothesis test to model the spectrum
sensing problem under the spectrum misuse behaviors, where
the states with the existence of the IU were formulated as com-
posite hypotheses due to the unknown characteristic of the IU.
We built a test criterion called the generalized multi-hypothesis
Neyman-Pearson (GMNP) criterion and derived two test rules
based on the GLRT and the Rao test, respectively. In particular,
we analyzed the problem of overlapping between decision
regions raised by the multi-hypothesis characteristic and rigid
constraints. To evaluate the test rule, the asymptotic perfor-
mance was derived and an upper bound of the detection perfor-
mance was also given through introducing the prior knowledge
about the range of the unknown variance. Furthermore, for the
multi-hypothesis test problem, a cooperative spectrum sensing
scheme was developed based on the global GMNP criterion.
The simulation results verified the detection performances in
terms of the unknown variance, the number of the samples,
the constraints, and the number of sensors.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Let A denote the space of the observation vectors, that is,
A = {y : yi ∈ R, i = 0, 1, ..., N}. Then, R0, R1, and R2 are
complete and mutually exclusive sets, that is, R0∪R1∪R2 =
A, Ri ∩ Rj = ∅, i 6= j. As Pr(Hi|Hi) =
∫
Ri p(y;Hi)dy, to
decrease Pr(Hi|Hi) is equivalent to shrink Ri. Therefore, if
Pr(H0|H0) and Pr(H1|H1) decrease, both R0 and R1 shrink.
As R2 = A − R0 − R1, R2 is enlarged and Pr(H2|H2)
increases.
Hence, when the maximum of Pr(H2|H2) is achieved,
R0 and R0 are compressed so that the conditions are justly
satisfied, i.e., Pr(H0|H0) = α, Pr(H1|H1) = β. Hence,
we obtain the equivalent optimization problem where the
inequalities are substituted with the equalities.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Firstly, we consider the critical point (αc, βc) which makes
the overlapping just happens, i.e., η0 = η1 = η∗1 . First, based
on (21), η∗1 is formulated
η∗1 = Γ
−1
(
N
2
, (1− αc)Γ(N
2
)
)
σ20 .
Substitute η∗1 for η1 in (28), and we have
(
η∗1
η2
)
N
2 exp(
η2 − η∗1
2σ21
) = 1.
So, we can obtain η∗2 that is the solution to the equation above,
η2 6= η1. Then, Pr(H1|H1) is formulated as follows
βc =
Γ(N2 ,
η∗1
σ21
)
Γ(N2 )
−
Γ(N2 ,
η∗2
σ21
)
Γ(N2 )
. (52)
Further, it is found that when β increases, λ1 increases, η1
decreases, and the area of the overlapping region increases. On
the other side, when α increases, η0 decreases and the area of
the overlapping region increases. This means that once β is
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over the value in (52), the overlapping happen. In conclusion,
the overlapping condition is obtained just as formulated in
(40).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we find the critical point
(αrc , β
r
c ) which makes η
R
0 = η
R
1 = η
r
1 . First, based on (21),
we have
ηr0 = Γ
−1
(
N
2
, (1− αrc)Γ(
N
2
)
)
σ20 .
Based on (36), we have ηr2 = 2Nσ
2
1 − ηr1 . Further, when
β increases, λR1 increases, η
R
1 decreases, and the area of
the overlapping region increases. On the other side, when α
increases, ηR0 decreases and the area of the overlapping region
increases. Hence, we obtain the overlapping condition in (44).
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
In (14), we obtain that to maximize Pr(H2|H2), in the
decision regions R0 and R1, we have{
p(y;H2)
p(y;H0) < λ0, R0,
p(y;H2)
p(y;H1) < λ0, R1.
(53)
Then, based on the range of σ22 , two cases are considered
respectively.
Case 1: σ20 < σ
2
2 < σ
2
1 . Based on (53), we have Y <
2σ20σ
2
2
σ22−σ20 (lnλ0 −
N
2 ln(
σ22
σ20
)) = η0, R0,
Y >
2σ21σ
2
2
σ22−σ21 (lnλ1 −
N
2 ln(
σ22
σ21
)) = η1, R1.
Due to lack of the a prior knowledge of σ22 , it seems to be
hard to build the detector. However, under the hypothesis Hi,
the statistic Y
σ2i
∼ χ2N . Therefore,
Pr(H0|H0) =
∫ η0
0
p(Y ;H0)dY = 1−
Γ(N2 ,
η0
σ20
)
Γ(N2 )
= α,
Pr(H1|H1) =
∫ +∞
η1
p(Y ;H1)dY =
Γ(N2 ,
η1
σ21
)
Γ(N2 )
= β.
Hence, without the a prior knowledge of σ22 , we obtain
the two thresholds, η0 = Γ−1(N2 , (1 − α)Γ(N2 ))σ20 , η1 =
Γ−1(N2 , βΓ(
N
2 ))σ
2
1 .
Case 2: σ22 > σ
2
1 Similarly, we have Y <
2σ20σ
2
2
σ22−σ20 (lnλ0 −
N
2 ln(
σ22
σ20
)) = η0, R0,
Y <
2σ21σ
2
2
σ22−σ21 (lnλ1 −
N
2 ln(
σ22
σ21
)) = η1, R1.
As σ20 < σ
2
1 , the two constraints are reformulated as
Pr(H0|H0) = 1−
Γ(N2 ,
η0
σ20
)
Γ(N2 )
= α,
Pr(H1|H1) =
Γ(N2 ,
η0
σ21
)
Γ(N2 )
−
Γ(N2 ,
η1
σ21
)
Γ(N2 )
= β.
Hence, we obtain the two thresholds, η0 = Γ−1(N2 , (1 −
α)Γ(N2 ))σ
2
0 , η1 = Γ
−1(N2 ,Γ(
N
2 ,
η0
σ21
)− βΓ(N2 ))σ21 .
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